In order for you to cut through the marketing hype, here’s a set of evaluation questions to ask deception technology vendors that will help you better understand disparate offerings.
\nIf you’re currently evaluating deception technology vendors, we’ve written a guide that goes deeper into some of the questions that we’ve listed above. You can download it here.
\n","excerpt":"Deception technology is a major buzzword today. In order for you to cut through the marketing hype, here’s a set of evaluation questions that will help you better understand disparate deception offerings and identify vendors that know what they’re doing.\n","slug":"10-questions-to-ask-your-deception-technology-provider","date":"2017-09-18T12:58:47.000Z","modified":"2020-01-05T09:26:06.000Z","status":"publish","featured_media":{"id":"cbfa76e5-6c88-57a7-a370-c16bd4df05ad","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/10questions-1.png","alt_text":"Deception technology 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\n\n\n\nWe sifted through this year’s report to compile the top 6 takeaways. Let’s go.
\n\n\n\nFewer businesses are now deploying security monitoring tools (35% vs. 40% last year) or undertaking any form of user monitoring (32% vs. 38%).
\n\n\n\nCompared to 46% of businesses in 2017, only 39% said that they detected any breach or attack. This can be attributed to fewer organizations deploying security controls and their limited ability to monitor remote employees.
\n\n\n\n83% of attacks on businesses and 79% on charities were in the form of phishing. These are consistent with the attack vectors reported in 2019 and 2020.
\n\n\n\n4 in 10 businesses and 1 in 4 charities were hit by a security breach/attack in the last 12 months.
\n\n\n\nOf the businesses and charities that reported a security breach/attack, a quarter of them were hit at least once a week,
\n\n\n\nThe data from this survey reinforces what we’re seeing globally:
\n\n\n\nYou can read the full report here.
\n\n\n\nThere’s no silver bullet. We can recommend four easy-to-implement active defense strategies that address security challenges around phishing and remote work access. These deception-based active defense recommendations are easy to implement, do not require complex tooling, and detect threats early.
\n\n\n\nEmail decoys are fake email accounts that intercept attackers attempting to mount social-engineering/spear-phishing attacks on high-value personnel.
\n\n\n\nSeed these decoys on social media and other Internet-facing assets where attackers scour for spear-phishing targets. These email decoys are enumerated by hackers and added to their target lists for sending spear-phishing emails. There is no reason for anyone to send any emails to the decoy email addresses. Therefore, any email sent to these addresses is a high-fidelity indication of an attack.
\n\n\n\nYou can integrate these with your SIEM to find other targets. Additionally, you can integrate with proxies to block access to spear-phishing domains.
\n\n\n\nEnabling employees to work from anywhere requires security teams to use VPNs, Citrix servers, and expose applications to the Internet.
\n\n\n\nAttackers target vulnerabilities in these remote access services to get into your network. Use that against them.
\n\n\n\nDeploy Internet-facing decoys that resemble vulnerable applications, databases, and servers. E.g., you can easily set up decoys that have the recent Citrix and ManageEngine vulnerabilities, making them attractive targets for the attackers.
\n\n\n\nAttackers looking for these assets during recon will discover and engage with the decoys as well. Any attempt to seek out these assets will alert you of incoming threats with low alert volume.
\n\n\n\nAttackers use credential stuffing and stolen credentials to break into organizations. These are hard to detect because the activity seems legitimate. You have two simple active defense plays here:
\n\n\n\nAs you’ve seen in the survey finding, fewer organizations have visibility into endpoints because now they are outside the perimeter. Consider using endpoint deception to build this visibility, detect attacks early, and stop lateral movement.
\n\n\n\nPlant endpoint decoys like fake files, processes, passwords, and cookies on the work machines of all your remote employees.
\n\n\n\nAn attacker on your employees’ machines will encounter these decoys and will be caught.
\n\n\n\nEndpoint deception follows the end-user, so even when they’re working from home, your ability to detect threats is not diminished. You gain visibility into home networks that are compromised without having to deploy appliances or network traffic monitoring choke-points.
\n\n\n\nActive defense is emerging as a viable approach to dealing with advanced attacks. MITRE has a new knowledge base dedicated to active defense. If you want to understand why this approach is gaining prominence in infosec circles, read this.
\n\n\n\nFor more on using active defense and deception for remote work security, check out the white paper.
Deception technology provides a unique approach to detecting adversary activity in a network. Compared to other detection controls, it’s easier to deploy, gives you greater visibility, and solves your false positives problem.
\n\n\n\nLet’s cut to the chase, shall we? Of course, I’m going to say this. I work for a company that sells a deception solution. I’m quite sure that if you’ve ever spoken to a deception vendor, you would have heard a similar pitch. If you haven’t talked to one, well, that’s more or less what you’re going to hear in a nutshell.
\n\n\n\nWhile what I’ve stated above is accurate, there are nuances to every approach. As they say, when it comes to cybersecurity, there are no silver bullets. I’m writing this post because when you’re evaluating technology or deploying it, you must understand the conditions under which it can be effective. It allows you to be pragmatic and set realistic expectations.
\n\n\n\nIn the next couple of paragraphs, I’m going to delve into nuances of deception technology that often don’t make it to marketing materials.
\n\n\n\nAs with any security control, there are several components that come together to make deception effective. For now, I’m going to focus on the three most important properties that can make or break a deception technology deployment. These are:
\n\n\n\nIn an ideal world, every deceptive component should exhibit all three properties in totality. The reality, however, is different.
\n\n\n\nSome decoys will be visible to folks inside your company but will be a popular target for attackers. Some will have limited realism but will not be fingeprintable. The point is, when you’re deploying deception in a living, breathing network, trade-offs have to be made – sometimes because of internal limitations, and other times because that’s the best strategy.
\n\n\n\nIn my experience, an understanding of these three properties helps in deciding what trade-offs to make and what you can expect. Let’s break them down one by one.
\n\n\n\nVisibility is an important consideration when deploying deceptive components. In organizations, highly visible decoys will lead to false positives and noise. However, the decoys themselves may be the only effective way to detect an adversary. Being aware of different deceptive components and their visibility property can help inform your thinking about what to do. Here’s a handy table.
\n\n\n\n| Component | Visibility to regular users |
| Private Threat Intelligence (Internet-facing decoys) | Not visible |
| Internal network decoys | Not visible |
| Active Directory decoys | Not visible |
| MiTM Deception | Not visible |
| Endpoint Deception – File Decoys | * Invisible unless the user chooses the option to show hidden files. * The Endpoint deception policy allows file decoys to be hidden to make them invisible to regular users. |
| Endpoint Deception – Browser Lures | * Cookies are invisible to the user. * Credentials may be viewed if the user browses to the Saved Password page. * Browser Favorites will be visible to the user. |
| Endpoint Deception – Session Lures | * Network Shares and Windows Credentials are placed in Credential Manager and rarely accessed by regular users and are therefore effectively invisible. * Session Lures created for software like PuTTY and WinSCP will be visible in the panel of saved sessions. |
| Endpoint Deception – Privilege Escalation | Not visible |
| Endpoint Deception – Defense Evasion | Effectively invisible. Fake Processes are visible in Task Manager but they masquerade as a real process and hide in plain sight. |
If an adversary can fingerprint your deceptive assets, she will be able to avoid them altogether. That can’t be good, can it? Here are a couple of things to consider when looking at deception solutions to figure out if they’re fingerprintable.
\n\n\n\nWhat are the characteristics of the decoys?
\n\n\n\nFor decoys deployed to the network, network characteristics can result in fingerprinting. While it’s relatively easy to fake characteristics like MAC addresses, Hostnames, and IP addresses, NetBIOS names are harder to spoof as they are tied to the machine itself.
\n\n\n\nAre they high interaction?
\n\n\n\nAll deception components have a limitation to the extent to which they fool an adversary. However, it’s important to test whether interacting with a deception component gives away large portions of your deployment. If decoys are created using multiple virtual network adapters from a single machine, it is likely that once you login to a decoy and run “ipconfig / ifconfig”, you will be able to figure out all the decoys projected from that host.
\n\n\n\nTest open-source fingerprinting tools
\n\n\n\nOpen-source fingerprinting tools like HoneypotBuster, attempt to fingerprint deception in active directory and fake credentials in memory. We recommend testing these tools, especially on computer objects in Active Directory as they contain properties that cannot be easily modified in a deception scenario. Also, tools like HoneypotBuster check only the domain from which the tool is run and will not check domains that are trusted in any way. Ensure that you run the tool against the domain where the deception has been configured in Active Directory.
\n\n\n\nThe realism of a deception component is critical to keeping an attacker engaged. Ideally, the component should be real enough that it allows the adversary to reveal tools, tactics, and techniques that are being used in your environment. It should also provide you with enough telemetry to determine what the next steps should be.
\n\n\n\nThe overarching goal here is to make the deception component real enough to engage the adversary for long enough so that you can respond to the event.
\n\n\n\nHere is some guidance for ensuring that the deception technology components you opt for meet the realism criteria:
\n\n\n\nWhen evaluating deception technology, visibility, realism, and fingerprinting should be some of the key components that you should closely look at to figure how the solution will play out in your network.
\n","excerpt":"When evaluating deception technology, look at three key components of the solution to ascertain how effective it will be in your environment – visibility, realism, and fingerprintability.\n","slug":"the-pragmatic-security-leaders-guide-to-deception-technology","date":"2021-02-01T04:04:10.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2021-02-01T12:39:33.000Z","wordpress_id":18727,"featured_media":{"id":"2a4ed0d8-6b54-5c32-b562-d58644b889bc","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Maze.jpeg","alt_text":"deception technology","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.5037593984962405,"src":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/14b42/Maze.jpg","srcSet":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/f836f/Maze.jpg 200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/2244e/Maze.jpg 400w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/14b42/Maze.jpg 800w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/47498/Maze.jpg 1200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/0e329/Maze.jpg 1600w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/42f14/Maze.jpg 1651w","srcWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/58556/Maze.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/61e93/Maze.webp 200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/1f5c5/Maze.webp 400w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/58556/Maze.webp 800w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/99238/Maze.webp 1200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/7c22d/Maze.webp 1600w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/34b00/Maze.webp 1651w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.5066666666666666,"src":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/32fd5/Maze.jpg","srcSet":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/06e94/Maze.jpg 113w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/07ab6/Maze.jpg 225w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/32fd5/Maze.jpg 450w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/4a838/Maze.jpg 675w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/9842e/Maze.jpg 900w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/42f14/Maze.jpg 1651w","srcWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/b8a88/Maze.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/3a3bf/Maze.webp 113w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/975bf/Maze.webp 225w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/b8a88/Maze.webp 450w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/761da/Maze.webp 675w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/210c1/Maze.webp 900w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/34b00/Maze.webp 1651w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"author":{"id":"765e8417-7ed6-55b7-95a7-1d561141e760","name":"Sudarshan Pisupati"}}},{"node":{"id":"e3cd17da-d028-5fad-bd26-31d9b3a4604d","title":"Using deception to shield the insurance sector","content":"\nLet’s cut to the chase, insurance companies are under siege from cyberattacks. An Accenture report from 2020 shows that attacks on insurers have more than doubled from 240 to 519, on average. Insurers also sit on top of sensitive customer data and are at risk of losing it – 44% exposed more than 500,000 customer records in 2019 compared to 15% for cross-industry peers.
\n\n\n\nAs more people around the world come under the ambit of insurance policies, the risk to insurers continues to grow. In this post, we take a look at some of the key pieces of an insurer’s infrastructure that adversaries target, why they go after it, and how you can use deception to build active defenses that mitigate the risk of these attacks and put you in a better position to detect and contain these threats,
\n\n\n\nFor a moment, step into the shoes of a malicious entity targeting an insurance company. Your goal is to get $$$. What are your best opportunities?
\n\n\n\nThe database of all policyholders and their policy details, complete with confidential and protected information is perhaps the most valuable asset of an insurer. This would be the holy grail of compromises. Given that a lot of this information is distributed across many systems (some of them legacy), protecting them is a challenge for the sector.
\n\n\n\nNot only would this data sell for a neat sum on the underground market, but it can also be weaponized in numerous ways, including and not limited to:
\n\n\n\nTo achieve this target, adversaries will have to invest time and money into:
\n\n\n\nCost-benefit analysis reveals Low to medium risk with an extremely high payout.
\n\n\n\nAdvanced and organized criminal syndicates.
\n\n\n\nInsurance companies deal with lots of files. Lots and lots of files. If an adversary succeeds in encrypting as many files as possible, the payout from this activity can be significant.
\n\n\n\nRansomware operators of any sophistication.
\n\n\n\nInsurance companies worldwide are expected to digitize their interactions with consumers. Everything from pre-sales to claims management is expected to be made available to consumers directly in a bid to simplify the consumer experience. This involves the adoption of cloud services, moving previously internal systems to Internet-facing infrastructure, and spinning up even more infrastructure to support business objectives. Adversaries now have a wider attack surface available to them to exploit.
\n\n\n\nMapping external infrastructure is a trivial task and therefore there are minimal considerations for groups adopting this approach.
\n\n\n\nLow effort with payout equivalent to the criticality of the infrastructure they compromise.
\n\n\n\nCybercriminals of any sophistication.
\n\n\n\nDeception is about tilting the odds of winning in your favor. It’s about making reasonable judgments about what the adversary might go after and presenting that information to them on a platter. Deception is about abstracting defenses to individual attacker techniques with lesser effort and increased cost to the attacker.
\n\n\n\nThe core principle of deception is the idea that any interaction with a decoy can be viewed as suspicious and warrants immediate action.
\n\n\n\nBroadly, the plan is to plant decoys across the network, from perimeter to end-point, to deceive the adversary. At a high-level, the following locations will be configured with decoys:
\n\n\n\nBy spreading decoys across the infrastructure, we maximize our chances of detecting adversaries. Remember, we only need to be able to detect the adversary once.
\n\n\n\nThe following is a break-down of what this might look like in practice.
\n\n\n\nLet’s say you don’t want to use deception. The alternative is to understand and defend yourself against every attacker technique. As per MITRE ATT&CK, these are over 100 and this does not account for variations in how these attacks might be executed.
\n\n\n\nDeception is grounded in addressing the motivations of the adversary and presenting fake information on a platter that adversaries find attractive. It is technique-agnostic and abstracts away the complexity that arises from blocking individual tools, techniques, and behaviors.
\n\n\n\nDeception is a form of Active Defense, where security teams take proactive steps to channel the adversary and make their life difficult. It varies from regular defense where you wait for an existing system to generate an alarm and then react.
\n\n\n\nMITRE new active defense framework, Shield, is being adopted by CISOs around the world and we see this approach being embraced by more and more security teams at insurance companies.
Distributed Deception Platforms are a hot topic today. Most CISOs are thinking of implementing deception technology or road-mapping it into their evaluations and budgets. The promises sound great:
\nUnfortunately, due to the unique secretive nature of deception (after all, you may not want people to know about it), there’s precious little information on how a security team can implement deception tecnology successfully and make it useful.
\nIf you’re being pushed to power-up a sleek appliance and kiss your cybersecurity woes goodbye, don’t believe the marketing hype — that’s not going to happen.
\nAfter implementing deception technology campaigns for the better part of a decade, we’ve compiled a list of the 7 deadly sins that will guarantee that your deception investment will disappoint you. Here we go:
\nIt’s quite obvious that for a deception technology deployment to be successful, you need an objective and a strategy. At a minimum, make sure you know what assets you’re trying to protect (they’re not all equal to the hacker). The best deception campaigns are extremely goal-oriented (e.g.: “Catch targeted attacks against my SWIFT servers, especially focused on breaches from third-party networks.”).
\nThe Fix: Make a list of your top 3 nightmare scenarios, and identify the assets (endpoints / servers / people / credentials / network zones) that are a part of those nightmares.
\nThere’s a reason some of the best deception specialists moonlight as threat hunters or red-teamers. Deception is an ‘active defence‘ capability — where deep knowledge of the attacker’s modus operandi is crucial. Knowing the critical paths an attacker will follow will massively boost the effectiveness of your deception capabilities.
\nThe Fix: Have your in-house / external red-team build attack trees to the assets you’ve identified at risk. Train your blue-team on how to think adversarially.
\nOne of the best things about deception technology is that the alerts are low false positive and real-time. That’s great, but when the metaphorical (or literal) phone rings, do you have a plan for how to respond? The attacker is very likely still ‘live and squirming’ on your infrastructure. This leads to interesting new opportunities and questions:
\nThe Fix: Have a specific set of incident response play-books for responding to deception alerts. War-game the scenarios end-to-end, ideally without your DFIR / blue-team being aware. Start basic and build a roadmap to advanced deception use cases.
\nConfident and experienced deception specialists will encourage (even insist) that you test the deception realism in your environment after you implement it. Not only does this validate that the deception is ‘working’ to meet your business objectives, but it will give you useful metrics like time-to-decieve, deception engagement time, coverage, and kill-chain hit ratios.
\nThe Fix: Blind test the strategy underlying your deception technology deployment. See how ‘real’ your simulated adversary believes the decoys are. Did you miss something? This is worth doing regularly.
\nThe best way to increase deception engagement time is to customise the decoys to your environment. There are a number of nifty tricks here (our MirageMaker feature does a lot of this for you), but never underestimate the power of human ingenuity.
\nThe Fix: Find the most devious folks in your infosec team and brainstorm how you can decieve, degrade, deny, disrupt, and dazzle an attacker even better. You want your deception to maximise the economic burden to the attacker in terms of time, effort, and cognitive load.
\nWell planned deception systems unify three perspectives to quickly arrive at the root cause of an incident:
\nWe call this the ‘deception trifecta’, and your entire strategy must be built around it.
\nThe Fix: Study the deception trifecta and determine how weak or strong you are on each side. Improve visibility, collection, and analysis speed for each perspective. Ensure supporting systems can flesh out context when deception systems alert you (e.g. do you have an updated asset inventory?)
\nRemember IDS? DLP? NAC? cough SIEM cough?
\nThe success of cybersecurity technologies is pretty binary: Either they’re well implemented by people who knew how to do it right, or far more often, they’re a mess of false promises and mismatched expectations. If you’re just being sold a box, AMC, and product training, there’s a lot missing. Sure, you might make it work, but the onus should be on the vendor to ensure you operationalise deception capabilities and see success for stuff that matters to you (we do this for every customer, big or small).
\nThe Fix: Talk to your provider to understand the depth of their knowledge on deception technology deployments, adversarial thinking, and most importantly, how they’ll make it all work for you. Get into specifics. Speak to their people. Hint: if their title says ‘Sales’… well… caveat emptor 🙂
\nDeception technology is more than just a new way to detect lateral movement, privilege escalation, ransomware, data-theft or solve any other current cybersecurity woes. It’s a fundamentally different way of thinking about how you defend your organisation, irrespective of shiny boxes (ours or anybody else’s)!
\nAvoid the mistakes above, and your security team will really see the benefits behind the hype. We have customers that now use deception as their ‘concertmaster‘ — the single most important pillar in their security stack, with everything else supporting it.
\nAt Smokescreen, we believe we’ve solved these problems through our technology, support, and experience. If you’d like to learn more about how we think it should be done, get in touch for a chat with our specialists!
\nIf you’re in the process of evaluating deception technology vendors, read our blog post on 10 questions you need to ask them or download our guide that dives deep into capabilities that make for a great deception solution.
\n\n\n\n","excerpt":"Since there’s precious little information on how security teams can make deception implementations successful (some folks like to keep it a secret), there’s plenty that can go wrong. Here are 7 ways to completely botch your deployment of deception technology.\n","slug":"7-deadly-sins-how-to-fail-at-implementing-deception-technology","date":"2017-09-18T14:01:05.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2020-01-05T09:25:57.000Z","wordpress_id":16912,"featured_media":{"id":"940f3e3f-92f9-56f6-91a1-525330dda41c","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/failwin.png","alt_text":"Fail At Deception Technology","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.680672268907563,"src":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/ee604/failwin.png","srcSet":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/69585/failwin.png 200w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/497c6/failwin.png 400w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/ee604/failwin.png 800w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/a8378/failwin.png 1024w","srcWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/58556/failwin.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/61e93/failwin.webp 200w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/1f5c5/failwin.webp 400w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/58556/failwin.webp 800w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/cc834/failwin.webp 1024w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.6865671641791045,"src":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/62b1f/failwin.png","srcSet":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/e7519/failwin.png 113w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/7e7e9/failwin.png 225w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/62b1f/failwin.png 450w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/e2e7f/failwin.png 675w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/db955/failwin.png 900w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/a8378/failwin.png 1024w","srcWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/b8a88/failwin.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/3a3bf/failwin.webp 113w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/975bf/failwin.webp 225w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/b8a88/failwin.webp 450w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/761da/failwin.webp 675w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/210c1/failwin.webp 900w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/cc834/failwin.webp 1024w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"author":{"id":"9257cd1e-ca7f-578b-a2dd-9c2e74282caf","name":"Smokescreen Team"}}},{"node":{"id":"0b6fe724-d0b1-5b1a-a31b-daeeb17e0310","title":"Deception and Kerckhoffs’s Cryptographic Principle","content":"Conceptually, deception is an incredibly intuitive approach to cybersecurity. The parallels between deception in the real-world, and deception in cyberspace are clear and easy to understand. However, in the digital battlefield it’s far more nuanced — it’s easy to do it badly, and far harder to get it right. Which makes it rather similar to a more traditional security practice — cryptography.
\nCryptographers are familiar with a well-known axiom called Kerckhoff’s principle, which states:
\n\nA cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.
This was famously paraphrased by Claude Shannon in what is known as Shannon’s Maxim:
\n\n“The enemy knows the system“, i.e., “one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them“
The applicability to deception is immediately apparent. It should remain effective, even when an attacker:
\nHowever, the exact map of the minefield — the specific placement of decoys, their running services, and their content is not known. This deception map is the equivalent of the secret key in a crypto-system. As long as the map is not known to the attacker, the illusion should still remain extremely effective, despite the attacker having complete visibility into the rest of the system.
\nAt Smokescreen, we are laser focused on making sure deception is ‘done right’ — with the necessary rigour and formal reasoning to hold up in real-world conditions. How do we do this? Our depth of experience in related cybersecurity disciplines is our secret weapon. We apply hard earned knowledge from red-teaming, asymmetric thinking, threat hunting, cryptography and incident response to build the most formidable and effective deception system available.
\n","excerpt":"The parallels between deception in the real-world, and deception in cyberspace are clear and easy to understand. However, deception in the digital battlefield is far more nuanced — it’s easy to do it badly, and far harder to get it right. Which makes it rather similar to a more traditional security practice — cryptography.\n","slug":"deception-and-kerckhoffss-cryptographic-principle","date":"2017-02-16T10:50:52.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2020-01-06T07:05:07.000Z","wordpress_id":16772,"featured_media":{"id":"c7ca7a31-c5f1-5880-8111-9cbfd1198f24","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Enigma-plugboard.jpg","alt_text":"Deception","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.4705882352941178,"src":"/static/33488cec05051fdb0cde315fb03b25b1/14b42/Enigma-plugboard.jpg","srcSet":"/static/33488cec05051fdb0cde315fb03b25b1/f836f/Enigma-plugboard.jpg 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