{"componentChunkName":"component---src-templates-article-js","path":"/7-deadly-sins-how-to-fail-at-implementing-deception-technology/","result":{"data":{"wordpressPost":{"title":"7 Ways to Fail At Implementing Deception Technology","content":"<p>Distributed Deception Platforms are a <a href=\"http://www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/gartner-top-technologies-for-security-in-2017/\">hot topic today</a>. Most CISOs are thinking of implementing deception technology or road-mapping it into their evaluations and budgets. The promises sound great:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Full kill-chain coverage with low false positives</li>\n<li>Deep visibility across endpoints and VLANs</li>\n<li>Lateral movement / privilege escalation detection of humans and malware</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Unfortunately, due to the unique secretive nature of deception (after all, you may not want people to know about it), there&#8217;s precious little information on how a security team can implement deception tecnology successfully and make it useful.</p>\n<p>If you&#8217;re being pushed to power-up a sleek appliance and kiss your cybersecurity woes goodbye, don&#8217;t believe the marketing hype &#8212; that&#8217;s not going to happen.</p>\n<p>After implementing deception technology campaigns for the better part of a decade, we&#8217;ve compiled a list of the 7 deadly sins that will guarantee that your deception investment will disappoint you. Here we go:</p>\n<h2><strong>1. You&#8217;re Not Sure What You&#8217;re Protecting</strong></h2>\n<p>It&#8217;s quite obvious that for a deception technology deployment to be successful, you need an objective and a strategy. At a minimum, make sure you know what assets you&#8217;re trying to protect (they&#8217;re not all equal to the hacker). The best deception campaigns are extremely goal-oriented (e.g.: &#8220;Catch targeted attacks against my SWIFT servers, especially focused on breaches from <a href=\"http://resources/mitigating-3rd-party-risks-for-atms-with-deception\" data-wplink-url-error=\"true\">third-party networks</a>.&#8221;).</p>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix:</strong> Make a list of your top 3 nightmare scenarios, and identify the assets (endpoints / servers / people / credentials / network zones) that are a part of those nightmares.</em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>2. You Don&#8217;t Know Your Enemy</strong></h2>\n<p>There&#8217;s a reason some of the best deception specialists moonlight as threat hunters or red-teamers. Deception is an &#8216;<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Defense\">active defence</a>&#8216; capability &#8212; where deep knowledge of the attacker&#8217;s <a href=\"https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Main_Page\">modus operandi</a> is crucial. Knowing the critical paths an attacker will follow will massively boost the effectiveness of your deception capabilities.</p>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix: </strong>Have your in-house / external red-team build <a href=\"https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1999/12/attack_trees.html\">attack trees</a> to the assets you&#8217;ve identified at risk. Train your blue-team on how to think adversarially.</em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>3. You&#8217;re Not Prepared for Deception Alerts</strong></h2>\n<p>One of the best things about deception technology is that the alerts are low false positive and real-time. That&#8217;s great, but when the metaphorical (or literal) phone rings, do you have a plan for how to respond? The attacker is very likely still &#8216;live and squirming&#8217; on your infrastructure. This leads to interesting new opportunities and questions:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Should you watch what they&#8217;re doing and learn more, or do you want to immediately contain?</li>\n<li>How are you handling forensics? Live or dead?</li>\n<li>Can you use the IOCs immediately to dimension the scope of the breach?</li>\n<li>Is there an opportunity for useful attacker attribution with more targeted deception?</li>\n</ul>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix: </strong>Have a specific set of incident response play-books for responding to deception alerts. War-game the scenarios end-to-end, ideally without your DFIR / blue-team being aware. Start basic and build a roadmap to advanced deception use cases.</em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>4. You Haven&#8217;t Tested Your Deception Strategy</strong></h2>\n<p>Confident and experienced deception specialists will encourage (even insist) that you test the deception realism in your environment after you implement it. Not only does this validate that the deception is &#8216;working&#8217; to meet your business objectives, but it will give you useful metrics like time-to-decieve, deception engagement time, coverage, and kill-chain hit ratios.</p>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix: </strong>Blind test the strategy underlying your deception technology deployment. See how &#8216;real&#8217; your simulated adversary believes the decoys are. Did you miss something? This is worth doing regularly.</em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>5. Your Deception is Not Customised</strong></h2>\n<p>The best way to increase deception engagement time is to customise the decoys to your environment. There are a number of nifty tricks here (our MirageMaker feature does a lot of this for you), but never underestimate the power of <a href=\"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/macron-campaign-team-used-honeypot-accounts-to-fake-out-fancy-bear/\">human ingenuity</a>.</p>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix:</strong> Find the most devious folks in your infosec team and brainstorm how you can decieve, degrade, deny, disrupt, and dazzle an attacker even better. You want your deception to maximise the economic burden to the attacker in terms of time, effort, and <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_load\">cognitive load.</a></em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>6. You Don&#8217;t Know the &#8216;Deception Trifecta&#8217;</strong></h2>\n<p>Well planned deception systems unify three perspectives to quickly arrive at the root cause of an incident:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>What is happening? (decoy telemetry)</li>\n<li>How is it happening? (endpoint forensics)</li>\n<li>Where else is it happening? (estate integrations / correlation)</li>\n</ol>\n<p>We call this the &#8216;deception trifecta&#8217;, and your entire strategy must be built around it.</p>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix: </strong></em><em>Study the deception trifecta and determine how weak or strong you are on each side. Improve visibility, collection, and analysis speed for each perspective. Ensure supporting systems can flesh out context when deception systems alert you (e.g. do you have an updated asset inventory?)</em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>7. Your Deception Provider Doesn&#8217;t &#8216;Get&#8217; Strategy</strong></h2>\n<p>Remember IDS? DLP? NAC? <em>cough</em> SIEM <em>cough</em>?</p>\n<p>The success of cybersecurity technologies is pretty binary: Either they&#8217;re well implemented by people who knew how to do it right, or far more often, they&#8217;re a mess of false promises and mismatched expectations. If you&#8217;re just being sold a box, AMC, and product training, there&#8217;s a lot missing. Sure, you <em>might</em> make it work, but the onus should be on the vendor to ensure you operationalise deception capabilities and see success for stuff that matters to you (we do this for <strong>every</strong> customer, big or small).</p>\n<p><em><strong>The Fix: </strong></em><em>Talk to your provider to understand the depth of their knowledge on deception technology deployments, <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/adversarial-thinking-improving-cybersecurity-with-ants-and-barcodes\">adversarial thinking</a>, and most importantly, how they&#8217;ll make it all work for you. Get into specifics. Speak to their people. Hint: if their title says &#8216;Sales&#8217;&#8230; well&#8230; caveat emptor 🙂</em></p>\n<h2> </h2>\n<h2><strong>In Summary &#8211; How To Get It Right</strong></h2>\n<hr />\n<ol>\n<li>Identify what will hurt you, and where those assets reside</li>\n<li>Know how your enemy will likely traverse your environment</li>\n<li>Create a tactical plan for handling deception alerts</li>\n<li>Blind test your deception strategy regularly</li>\n<li>Customise your deception environment &#8216;by hand&#8217;</li>\n<li>Know the &#8216;Deception Trifecta&#8217; and improve how you use it</li>\n<li>Choose a provider who will build a capability, not sell a box</li>\n</ol>\n<p>Deception technology is more than just a new way to detect lateral movement, privilege escalation, ransomware, data-theft or solve any other current cybersecurity woes. It&#8217;s a fundamentally different <em>way of thinking</em> about how you defend your organisation, irrespective of shiny boxes (ours or anybody else&#8217;s)!</p>\n<p>Avoid the mistakes above, and your security team will really see the benefits behind the hype. We have <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/deception-technology-at-the-worlds-fastest-stock-exchange\">customers</a> that now use deception as their &#8216;<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concertmaster\">concertmaster</a>&#8216; &#8212; the single most important pillar in their security stack, with everything else supporting it.</p>\n<p>At Smokescreen, we believe we&#8217;ve solved these problems through our technology, support, and experience. If you&#8217;d like to learn more about how we think it should be done, <a href=\"/contact-us/\">get in touch</a> for a chat with our specialists!</p>\n<p>If you&#8217;re in the process of evaluating deception technology vendors, read our <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/10-questions-to-ask-your-deception-technology-provider\">blog post</a> on 10 questions you need to ask them or <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/a-guide-to-evaluating-deception-technology\">download our guide</a> that dives deep into capabilities that make for a great deception solution.</p>\n\n\n<p></p>\n","excerpt":"Since there’s precious little information on how security teams can make deception implementations successful (some folks like to keep it a secret), there’s plenty that can go wrong. Here are 7 ways to completely botch your deployment of deception technology.\n","slug":"7-deadly-sins-how-to-fail-at-implementing-deception-technology","date":"2017-09-18T14:01:05.000Z","modified":"2020-01-05T09:25:57.000Z","status":"publish","featured_media":{"id":"940f3e3f-92f9-56f6-91a1-525330dda41c","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/failwin.png","alt_text":"Fail At Deception Technology","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.680672268907563,"src":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/ee604/failwin.png","srcSet":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/69585/failwin.png 200w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/497c6/failwin.png 400w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/ee604/failwin.png 800w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/a8378/failwin.png 1024w","srcWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/58556/failwin.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/61e93/failwin.webp 200w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/1f5c5/failwin.webp 400w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/58556/failwin.webp 800w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/cc834/failwin.webp 1024w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.6865671641791045,"src":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/62b1f/failwin.png","srcSet":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/e7519/failwin.png 113w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/7e7e9/failwin.png 225w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/62b1f/failwin.png 450w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/e2e7f/failwin.png 675w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/db955/failwin.png 900w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/a8378/failwin.png 1024w","srcWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/b8a88/failwin.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/3a3bf/failwin.webp 113w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/975bf/failwin.webp 225w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/b8a88/failwin.webp 450w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/761da/failwin.webp 675w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/210c1/failwin.webp 900w,\n/static/741aacdb6ba2e8df1b88b93b521715a6/cc834/failwin.webp 1024w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"categories":[{"id":"a725b316-af4b-5d16-8453-4b07c65d8fca","slug":"deception","name":"deception"},{"id":"03533eef-c5e9-551b-a353-20b8adfa03b9","slug":"gartner","name":"Gartner"},{"id":"91492045-3e86-5e2f-a34f-b0855c540ccf","slug":"industry","name":"industry"},{"id":"cb312b9c-68d1-53f5-99b1-3127e4bead1c","slug":"philosophy","name":"philosophy"},{"id":"0aaaa4e2-c9fd-5357-95d2-3884b38b33c0","slug":"strategy","name":"strategy"},{"id":"836fd412-127d-5daa-9f15-790564d66ac0","slug":"uncategorized","name":"Uncategorized"}],"author":{"id":"9257cd1e-ca7f-578b-a2dd-9c2e74282caf","name":"Smokescreen Team"},"yoast_meta":{"yoast_wpseo_twitter_title":"","yoast_wpseo_twitter_description":"","yoast_wpseo_redirect":"","yoast_wpseo_opengraph_title":"","yoast_wpseo_opengraph_description":"","yoast_wpseo_metakeywords":"","yoast_wpseo_metadesc":"Companies often fail at implementing deception technology because of these common mistakes. Learn what to avoid to ensure a successful deployment.","yoast_wpseo_meta_robots_noindex":"","yoast_wpseo_meta_robots_nofollow":"","yoast_wpseo_meta_robots_adv":"","yoast_wpseo_linkdex":"73","yoast_wpseo_focuskw":"implementing deception technology","yoast_wpseo_canonical":""}},"relatedPosts":{"edges":[{"node":{"id":"e3cd17da-d028-5fad-bd26-31d9b3a4604d","title":"Using deception to shield the insurance sector","content":"\n<p>Let’s cut to the chase, insurance companies are under siege from cyberattacks. An Accenture <a href=\"https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/financial-services/cyber-resilience-study-insurance\">report</a> from 2020 shows that attacks on insurers have more than doubled from 240 to 519, on average. Insurers also sit on top of sensitive customer data and are at risk of losing it – 44% exposed more than 500,000 customer records in 2019 compared to 15% for cross-industry peers.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>As more people around the world come under the ambit of insurance policies, the risk to insurers continues to grow. In this post, we take a look at some of the key pieces of an insurer’s infrastructure that adversaries target, why they go after it, and how you can use deception to build active defenses that mitigate the risk of these attacks and put you in a better position to detect and contain these threats,</p>\n\n\n\n<p>For a moment, step into the shoes of a malicious entity targeting an insurance company. Your goal is to get $$$. What are your best opportunities?</p>\n\n\n\n<h3><strong>Opportunity #1 &#8211; Compromise the database cluster or core application</strong></h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The database of all policyholders and their policy details, complete with confidential and protected information is perhaps the most valuable asset of an insurer. This would be the holy grail of compromises. Given that a lot of this information is distributed across many systems (some of them legacy), protecting them is a challenge for the sector.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Opportunities</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Not only would this data sell for a neat sum on the underground market, but it can also be weaponized in numerous ways, including and not limited to: </p>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Selling to competition (Corporate Espionage).</li><li>Blackmail with public data release.</li><li>Monitise via channels for spam and other nefarious activities.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Considerations</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>To achieve this target, adversaries will have to invest time and money into:</p>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Getting a foothold inside the organization.</li><li>Build tooling to evade security defenses.</li><li>Reverse engineering how insurance companies operate.</li><li>Finding the cluster.</li><li>Finding credentials to the cluster.</li><li>Exfiltrating information (probably in the order of GBs and TBs).</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Decision Criteria</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Cost-benefit analysis reveals Low to medium risk with an extremely high payout.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Profiles</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Advanced and organized criminal syndicates.</p>\n\n\n\n<h3><strong>Opportunity #2 &#8211; Deploy Ransomware</strong></h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Insurance companies deal with lots of files. Lots and lots of files. If an adversary succeeds in encrypting as many files as possible, the payout from this activity can be significant.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Opportunities</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Off-the-shelf attack tooling is easily available.</li><li>Attack a wider base of companies across the sector.</li><li>A lower initial investment in research, saving time and money.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Considerations</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Backup of files can minimize returns.</li><li>Manual effort to gain privileges may be required.</li><li>Decision criteria.</li><li>Low effort with medium to high payout.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Profile&nbsp;</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Ransomware operators of any sophistication.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h3><strong>Opportunity #3 &#8211; Attacking public-facing Direct-to-Consumer applications</strong></h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Insurance companies worldwide are expected to digitize their interactions with consumers. Everything from pre-sales to claims management is expected to be made available to consumers directly in a bid to simplify the consumer experience. This involves the adoption of cloud services, moving previously internal systems to Internet-facing infrastructure, and spinning up even more infrastructure to support business objectives. Adversaries now have a wider attack surface available to them to exploit.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Opportunities</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Off-the-shelf attack tooling is easily available.</li><li>Attack a wider base of companies across the sector.</li><li>A lower initial investment in research, saving time and money.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Considerations</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Mapping external infrastructure is a trivial task and therefore there are minimal considerations for groups adopting this approach.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Decision Criteria</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Low effort with payout equivalent to the criticality of the infrastructure they compromise.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Adversary Profile</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Cybercriminals of any sophistication.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h3><strong>Your Defense Plan in a nutshell</strong></h3>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Detect attempts to compromise the core application and database layer at any cost.</li><li>Prevent the spread of sophisticated ransomware.</li><li>Defending Internet-facing infrastructure.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h3><strong>Enter Deception</strong></h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Deception is about tilting the odds of winning in your favor. It’s about making reasonable judgments about what the adversary might go after and presenting that information to them on a platter. Deception is about abstracting defenses to individual attacker techniques with lesser effort and increased cost to the attacker. </p>\n\n\n\n<p>The core principle of deception is the idea that any interaction with a decoy can be viewed as suspicious and warrants immediate action.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Using deception to beat adversary motivations</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Broadly, the plan is to plant decoys across the network, from perimeter to end-point, to deceive the adversary. At a high-level, the following locations will be configured with decoys:</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Decoys in the perimeter.</li><li>Decoys in the network.</li><li>Decoys on the endpoint.</li><li>Decoys in Active Directory.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>By spreading decoys across the infrastructure, we maximize our chances of detecting adversaries. Remember, we only need to be able to detect the adversary once. </p>\n\n\n\n<p>The following is a break-down of what this might look like in practice.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Decoy applications at the perimeter</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Create clones of your policyholder and vendor web pages and put them at the perimeter.</li><li>As adversaries attempt to enumerate the internet-facing infrastructure, they will be presented with attractive targets.&nbsp;</li><li>Any interaction on these decoys warrants the immediate block of the IP and increases the cost to the attacker.&nbsp;</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Decoy Systems on the network</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Create clones of the core application and databases and place them in the DC/DR segments.&nbsp;</li><li>Create decoy file shares populated with interesting files that look like they have sensitive information and place them in server zones&nbsp;</li><li>As adversaries attempt to enumerate and discover systems on the network, decoy systems will generate an alarm.&nbsp;</li><li>Any interaction against these clones must be responded to immediately.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Decoy core application and database users in Active Directory</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>In your primary Active Directory domain, create fake users for the application and database.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li><li>Also, create fake records for core applications and database computers.&nbsp;</li><li>Adversaries rely on Active Directory to understand the internal environment and any interaction with the fake records of users and computers will generate an alarm.&nbsp;</li><li>Monitor for any login activity and enumeration activities and chase them down to kill the operation.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h4>Decoys on the endpoint</h4>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Deploy file decoys, decoy credentials, fake processes, and deceptive ransomware detection capabilities to key endpoints. Roll-out endpoint decoys to all personnel handling sensitive information as well as administrators of the core application and databases.&nbsp;</li><li>As adversaries attempt to move across the environment, any attempt to interact with decoy files and credentials will be recorded.&nbsp;</li><li>Monitor for any interaction on endpoint decoys and block the source from being able to communicate on the network.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<h3><strong>What’s the alternative?</strong></h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Let’s say you don’t want to use deception. The alternative is to understand and defend yourself against every attacker technique. As per MITRE ATT&amp;CK, these are over 100 and this does not account for variations in how these attacks might be executed. </p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deception is grounded in addressing the motivations of the adversary and presenting fake information on a platter that adversaries find attractive. It is technique-agnostic and abstracts away the complexity that arises from blocking individual tools, techniques, and behaviors. </p>\n\n\n\n<p>Deception is a form of <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/active-defense-for-incident-responders/\">Active Defense</a>, where security teams take proactive steps to channel the adversary and make their life difficult. It varies from regular defense where you wait for an existing system to generate an alarm and then react.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>MITRE new active defense framework, Shield, is being <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/adopting-the-mitre-shield-framework-with-smokescreen/\">adopted</a> by CISOs around the world and we see this approach being embraced by more and more security teams at insurance companies.<br></p>\n","excerpt":"Insurance companies are under siege from cyberattacks. We take a look at some of the key pieces of an insurer’s infrastructure the adversaries target and how you can use deception to build active defenses.\n","slug":"using-deception-to-shield-the-insurance-sector","date":"2021-01-26T12:23:04.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2021-02-01T03:41:54.000Z","wordpress_id":18716,"featured_media":{"id":"906d7d6e-966b-59f3-9c9d-9b14d27d8746","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Shield-insurance.png","alt_text":"Active defense and deception for 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450px"}}}},"author":{"id":"765e8417-7ed6-55b7-95a7-1d561141e760","name":"Sudarshan Pisupati"}}},{"node":{"id":"e68006e7-ad47-5422-b7f1-7966cba61573","title":"Finding active defense opportunities in a pentest report","content":"\n<p>Pentest reports tell a story. The story of how the team managed to break into your environment. In my experience, a critical component usually missing from these reports is the rationale behind the choices made by the pentesters who ran the assessment.</p>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Why did they go after a particular account?</li><li>Why did they target a specific set of servers?</li><li>Why did they choose one lateral movement technique over the other?</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Asking <em>why</em> allows you to deconstruct choices that real threat actors might make in your environment. Having a sense of those choices will give you some active defense opportunities.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Let me demonstrate this with a little thought experiment. Let’s consider a pentest where the objective was to demonstrate access to the customer database. Here’s what the pentesters broadly did:</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Established a C2 using PowerShell.</li><li>Enumerated the Active Directory domain for users and groups, specifically privileged groups.</li><li>Enumerated the domain to find computers.</li><li>Attempted privilege escalation techniques and compromised the domain admin.</li><li>Scanned a subset of computers to identify the customer DB.</li><li>Used the domain admin account to login to the database server.</li><li>Logged into the Customer DB.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>In each of these steps, the pentesters made some choices. As you’ll now see, deconstructing these choices can help build better defenses.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Deconstructing the pentest report to find Active Defense plays</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>The <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/matrix/\">Active Defense matrix </a>was released by MITRE to provide a framework for <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/adopting-the-mitre-shield-framework-with-smokescreen/\">identifying opportunities</a> where adversary behavior can be influenced to enable defenders to easily spot threats.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>The foundation of the Active Defense approach rests on three principles:</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Beat the human behind the software</li><li>Do simple things the adversary does not anticipate to encourage or complicate their operation.</li><li>Make sure the things you do allows the corresponding telemetry to stand out i.e. collect more effective telemetry.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>So let’s begin by deconstructing each of the 7 steps in the report to identify Active Defense opportunities</p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#1 &#8211; C2 using PowerShell</h3>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why PowerShell?&nbsp;</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Sophisticated off the shelf tooling</li><li>PowerShell logging &amp; blocking not widely implemented</li><li>Great obfuscation capabilities</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunity</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Block PowerShell to force the adversary to use non-PowerShell options.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Advantage</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Since PowerShell usage for C2 is fairly common, it reduces the risk of being hit with commodity malware that uses PowerShell even today.</p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique:</strong> <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0032/\">Security Controls</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#2 &#8211; Enumerated the domain for users and groups</h3>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why enumerate the users?</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Find privileged group members of groups like Domain and Enterprise Admin. Successful compromise of DA / EA will almost certainly result in customer DB access down the line, so it’s important to know who they are.</li><li>Run keyword searches across attributes like username, SPN, description, etc. to find accounts that can be used for SQL logins. Example ‘SQL’, ‘DB’, ‘etc’. This will be useful down the line when it’s time to figure out how to login to the database, regardless of whether you have domain admin credentials or not.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunity</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Setup attractive decoy accounts, assign attractive privileges, and setup attribute level auditing on description, SPN, etc. to monitor enumeration attempts. This has the added advantage of detecting password spraying regardless of intensity and staggering strategies.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Advantage</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Gain insight into enumeration activities being conducted against the domain from a user perspective.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>(Note: Don’t ever use these accounts for any operations. There are ways to make this opsec safe)</p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique:</strong> <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0010/\">Decoy Account</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#3 &#8211; Enumerated the domain for computers</h3>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why enumerate the computers?</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Run keyword searches across attributes like hostname, SPN, description, etc. to find accounts that could be SQL servers. Example ‘SQL’, ‘DB’, ‘etc’. This will be useful down the line when it’s time to figure out where the DB is located.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunity</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Setup decoy computers, assign attractive hostnames to databases, and setup attribute level auditing on description, SPN, etc. to monitor enumeration attempts.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Advantage</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Gain insight into enumeration activities being conducted against the domain from a computer perspective.</p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique: </strong><a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0017/\">Decoy System</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#4 &#8211; Privilege Escalation</h3>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why Privilege Escalation?</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Get to a higher level of privilege. In this case, the target privilege level is the database/server administrator on the customer database.</li><li>Escalated privileges can allow you admin access to one, few, many, or all systems on the network.</li><li>With high privileges, you have the opportunity to log in to more systems and steal credentials.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>Let’s assume that Kerberoasting was the privilege escalation technique that worked. In this case, let’s also assume that the service account was a domain admin.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why Kerberoasting?</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>It targets service accounts i.e. accounts that have an SPN attribute configured.</li><li>Service account passwords never expire.</li><li>Sometimes, service accounts are granted DA privileges. At the very least, they have admin privileges somewhere.</li><li>Some service accounts are so old that no one remembers they exist and have weak passwords.</li><li>It’s really difficult to detect on the wire.</li><li>Logs related to service ticket operations are not logged by default. If they are, it is difficult to tell the difference between legitimate and malicious service ticket operations.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunity</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Setup a decoy kerberoastable account, assign attractive usernames to databases (e.g. SQLAdmin), add a SQL-related SPN (e.g. MSSQLSvc/custdb.domain.com), and write a rule to capture Event ID 4769 for the decoy account.</li><li>Remove the real domain admin service account from being kerberoastable or downgrade its privileges.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Advantage</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Makes the adversary believe they have obtained hashes to the customer database SQL service account while at the same time removing the risk of kerberoasting a real domain admin account.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>A similar approach can be used for other popular privilege escalation techniques.</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Tomcat Manager exploit &#8211; Plan a decoy system with Tomcat manager and monitor for connections and interactions towards this system.</li><li>LLMNR poisoning &#8211; Use a tool like <a href=\"https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh\">Conveigh</a> to send decoy broadcasts over the subnet and monitor for responses to these broadcasts.</li><li>Credential Dumping &#8211; Use <a href=\"https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Invoke-Runas.ps1\">Invoke-runas</a> to plant fake domain admin credentials in memory using the /netonly technique.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>There are many techniques available for privilege escalation, and some of them lend themselves well to an Active Defense approach. However, in cases where that doesn’t work, focus on what the adversary intends to accomplish with those privileged credentials.</p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique: </strong><a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0010/\">Decoy Account</a>, <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0017/\">Decoy System</a>, <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0032/\">Security Controls</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#5 &#8211; Scanned a subset of computers to identify the customer DB</h3>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why Scan?</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Check if the database server is reachable from the target list compiled in #3.</li><li>Check if the database port is open.</li><li>Check if any banners reveal which might be the customer database.</li><li>Check for default passwords on SQL servers for the ‘sa’ account.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunities</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Plant a decoy SQL server on the network. Alert when you see port enumeration.</li><li>Make the real customer database accessible only from certain machines.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Advantage</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Even a single port query against the decoy SQL server system is worth investigating while complicating access to the real customer database.</p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique: </strong><a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0025\">Network Diversity</a>, <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0013\">Decoy Diversity</a>, <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0026\">Network Manipulation</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#6 &#8211; Used the domain admin account to login to the customer database server</h3>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Why log in to the customer database server?</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>With domain admin privileges, you can extract credentials from memory from the customer database.</li><li>Helps you compromise the logged-on SQL administrator account (whether it&#8217;s a user or service doesn’t matter).</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunities</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Implement a standard operating procedure to prevent a domain admin from ever logging into the database server. Implement the corresponding rule for this server alone in your SIEM.</li><li>Plant decoy SQL administrator credentials in memory.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Advantage</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Even a single port query against the decoy SQL server system is worth investigating while complicating access to the real customer database</p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique: </strong><a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0033\">Standard Operating Procedure</a>, <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0012\">Decoy Credentials</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>#7 &#8211; Login to the database itself</h3>\n\n\n\n<p>Unfortunately, if the adversary has reached this point, detection difficulty increases. This is because, from an analytics perspective, you are looking for a legitimate account, logging into a legitimate database, and running possibly legitimate queries. However, there are still things we can do.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Active Defense Opportunities</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Setup query auditing on the SQL server for accounts with DB admin rights.</li><li>Hunt for non-standard queries in the hope of spotting the adversary running ‘select *’ operations and join operations to fully extract the customer database.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Technique:</strong> <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0021\">Hunting</a>, <a href=\"https://shield.mitre.org/techniques/DTE0034\">System Activity Monitoring</a></p>\n\n\n\n<h3>Apply Active Defense Approach to any use case</h3>\n\n\n\n<p>I present an abstracted approach to applying Active Defense use cases. It has 4 pieces:</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li><strong>Deceive</strong> &#8211; Can I do something to trick the adversary en route to/on the system?</li><li><strong>Standardize</strong> &#8211; Can I define how a particular system must be used/controlled?</li><li><strong>Analyze</strong> &#8211; Can I bubble-up anomalies against the system I am protecting?</li><li><strong>Control</strong> &#8211; Can I make it more difficult to reach and compromise the system?</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>You can use the above as a combination to assess a use case beyond just analyzing pentest reports. The pentest report was just a means for me to present my idea.</p>\n\n\n\n<h3>Closing Notes</h3>\n\n\n\n<p>I would like you to note a few things.</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Use of the Active Defense approach covers the kill-chain and encourages you to think about the ‘why’ to build better defenses and how your network, endpoints, and <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/four-mitre-shield-techniques-you-can-implement-in-2021/\">active directory</a> are all interconnected.</li><li>It reduces complexity otherwise introduced by large scale data analytics across GBs of logs a day.</li><li>The active defense approach is not limited to decoys alone, but it is a significant component.</li><li>You don’t have to baseline and standardize operating procedures across everything. Just the stuff that matters to you.</li><li>You can tighten your hunt use cases with Active Defense, making hunting a lot more productive.</li><li>You can take a targeted approach to apply controls, rather than spray controls all over the network that costs time and requires effort.</li></ol>\n","excerpt":"Pentest reports tell a story. By asking why a pentester made certain choices, you can find opportunities to influence attacker behavior and actively defend your network.\n","slug":"finding-active-defense-opportunities-in-a-pentest-report","date":"2021-01-24T16:36:47.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2021-02-01T04:52:23.000Z","wordpress_id":18707,"featured_media":{"id":"c2327fb5-d82c-5803-a242-8195b7731a09","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Finding-active-defense-opportunities.jpeg","alt_text":"active defense 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It&#8217;s a new active defense knowledge base released by MITRE – stuff they&#8217;ve been implementing for over a decade to engage adversaries and derail attacks. They&#8217;ve opened it up to everyone, and for the first time perhaps, the infosec community has a shared vocabulary and framework for actively defending against attacks instead of reacting to them.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>I&#8217;ve been having conversations about MITRE Shield and Active Defense with CISOs and customers. While some of the conversations are basic and around <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/active-defense-for-incident-responders/\">what is active defense and why does it matter</a>, what I consistently hear from across the board is –&nbsp;&#8220;how do we even begin to implement this stuff?&#8221; That&#8217;s a fair question, but it&#8217;s only one part. What more folks aren&#8217;t asking is, where do we implement active defenses for the most impact.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>I&#8217;ve zeroed down on four active defense techniques from the MITRE Shield matrix that address both the questions – how do I get started with this and where should I be building active defenses first. Think of this as a soft launch guide for your Active Defense journey.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>I&#8217;ve selected techniques based on two factors:</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>Should be easy to implement without involving too many teams.</li><li>Should have a very high impact on disrupting adversary actions.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>As a result, all four defenses are Active Directory exclusive. Active Directory has become an adversary favorite attack vector. By deploying active defenses in Active Directory, you&#8217;ll be able to make great strides in disrupting adversary actions.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Are there any prerequisites?</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Only two:</p>\n\n\n\n<ol><li>You must be able to make some minor changes to your Active Directory server.</li><li>You must have access to a test machine. This could be your own machine or one that&#8217;s given to you. It would be great if this machine was not network access restricted in any way to maximize engagement.</li></ol>\n\n\n\n<p>Let&#8217;s dive right in.</p>\n\n\n\n<h3>MITRE Shield Technique #1 &#8211; Decoy Account</h3>\n\n\n\n<p>MITRE Shield Procedure &#8211; DPR002</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Plant decoy accounts in your Active Directory. Any interaction with these accounts is a high-confidence indicator of compromise. These accounts will also help you study the adversary&#8217;s actions, mislead attackers by putting these accounts in their path during enumeration, and use them to influence the attacker&#8217;s actions and next steps.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4><strong>Step 1 &#8211; Use case setup</strong></h4>\n\n\n\n<p>Set up a decoy account and give it “Domain Admin” privileges. This will make the account interesting to the adversary.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-1-Step-1-2.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 2 &#8211;&nbsp;Auditing Setup and Attack Demo</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In this video, we focus on detecting the operation. We show how to setup Windows Auditing so that we can capture the appropriate log. We also demonstrate an attack to test if the logs are captured appropriately.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-1-Step-2-1.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Psuedo-code for detection rule:</em></strong></p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-preformatted\">If login_activity observed for decoy_account then raise a high priority alert.</pre>\n\n\n\n<h3>MITRE Shield Technique #2 &#8211; Decoy Systems and Decoy Content</h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Procedures &#8211; DPR0022 and DPR0033</strong></p>\n\n\n\n<p>Decoy systems are an excellent active defense tool because they act as a target to lure away attackers from legitimate assets. Decoy content could be anything ranging from fake files to browser shortcuts that act as breadcrumbs to point adversaries to decoy systems.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 1 &#8211; Use Case Setup</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In this video, we set up a webserver on our test machine to channel an adversary towards interacting with it. We create a browser shortcut and place it in a publically accessible location on the Active Directory Server to make it easier for the adversary to discover.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-2-Step-1-1.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 2 &#8211; Auditing Setup and Attack Demo</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>We ensure that our web server is logging connections. If an adversary attempts to conduct reconnaissance against this webserver, we should see a logline in the webserver log.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-2-Step-2-1.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Psuedo-code for detection rule:</em></strong></p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-preformatted\">If REQUEST observed for /admin then raise a high priority alert.</pre>\n\n\n\n<h3>MITRE Shield Technique #3 &#8211; Decoy Credentials</h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Procedure &#8211; DPR0024</strong></p>\n\n\n\n<p>Decoy credentials are fake usernames and passwords that can be planted in a variety of places including in the Active Directory. They act as silent alarms when interacted with and also as a means to delay the attacker.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 1 &#8211; Use Case Setup</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In this video, we create a batch file planted with fake credentials and store it in a publically accessible location on the Active Directory Server to make it easier for the adversary to discover.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-3-Step-1-2.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 2 &#8211; Auditing Setup and Attack Demo</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In this video, we show how to set up auditing on your test machine to capture attempts to use the credentials against your test machine.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-3-Step-2-1.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Psuedo-code for detection rule:</em></strong></p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-preformatted\">If login_event is 4625 AND username is admin<br>Then raise a high priority alert.</pre>\n\n\n\n<h3>MITRE Shield Technique 4 &#8211; Pocket Litter</h3>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>MITRE Shield Procedure &#8211; DPR0052</strong></p>\n\n\n\n<p>Pocket litter is an active defense technique used to mislead attackers into thinking that the system and user they&#8217;re exploiting are legit. You plant fake documents, browser history, browser sessions, etc. to give adversaries the confidence that they are on the right track.</p>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 1 &#8211; Use Case Setup</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In this video, we will set up a file share on the test machine. We will plant a shortcut to this file share in a publically accessible location on the Active Directory Server to make it easier for the adversary to discover.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-4-Step-1-1.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<h4>Step 2 &#8211; Auditing Setup and Attack Demo</h4>\n\n\n\n<p>In this video, we show how to set up file share auditing on your test machine to capture attempts to access the file share on your machine.</p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-video\"><video src=\"https://internal-wp.smokescreen.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Technique-4-Step-2-1.mov\" controls=\"controls\"></video></figure>\n\n\n\n<p><strong><em>Psuedo-code for detection rule:</em></strong></p>\n\n\n\n<pre class=\"wp-block-preformatted\">If login_event is 5140 AND share_name contains shared_folder_name\nThen raise a high priority alert.</pre>\n\n\n\n<h3>Why have you chosen the SYSVOL folder in your videos?</h3>\n\n\n\n<p>These folders are accessible to all users within your environment. Over time, these folders accrue a lot of files and scripts that are interesting to adversaries. We wish to use these folders to misdirect the attacker, should the attacker go browsing through these folders. It is also uncommon for regular users to require to browse through this folder.</p>\n\n\n\n<h3>Closing Notes</h3>\n\n\n\n<p>The focus of this guide was to get your mind thinking about active defense. If there&#8217;s one thing I&#8217;d like you to walk away with, it&#8217;s that if any of these defenses trigger an alarm you will have discovered malicious activity for a couple of hours of effort. And it cost you nothing.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>At Smokescreen, we&#8217;ve been implementing active defense programs since before it was a thing. No wonder then that Smokescreen covered 95% of MITRE Shield when it launched in Sep 2020. If you&#8217;d like to see how we can help, hit us up. <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/adopting-the-mitre-shield-framework-with-smokescreen/\">Here&#8217;s a mapping</a> of Smokescreen to MITRE Shield if it&#8217;s helpful.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>We&#8217;re also running active defense workshops where we deconstruct MITRE Shield and talk about how you can implement it. <a href=\"https://meetings.hubspot.com/sahirh/active-defense-workshop\">Feel free to sign up.</a></p>\n","excerpt":"For free, of course. At this point, I’m positive that you’ve heard of MITRE Shield. It’s a new active defense knowledge base released by MITRE – stuff they’ve been implementing for over a decade to engage adversaries and derail attacks. They’ve opened it up to everyone, and for the first time perhaps, the infosec community 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As MITRE puts it, Shield has been &#8220;derived from over 10 years of adversary engagement experience. It spans the range from high level, CISO ready considerations of opportunities and objectives, to practitioner friendly discussions of the TTPs available to defenders.&#8221;</p>\n\n\n\n<p>As an industry armed with protecting networks and IT infrastructures, we have been overly reliant on passive defenses. Given the rapid pace of technology development, shortage of skilled cybersecurity professionals, and the vendor community&#8217;s &#8216;assume breach&#8217; schtick, we have become accustomed to dealing with threats on our turf, on the adversary&#8217;s terms, instead of actively smoking out the threat. We&#8217;re always reacting after the fact. Which is why Shield couldn&#8217;t have arrived sooner.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Since then, I&#8217;ve had countless conversations with CISOs attempting to understand how Shield can inform their security posture and incident handlers/practitioners on what they can do today that might have an outsized impact on their ability to defend. I&#8217;ve also realized that there&#8217;s a fundamental conversation to be had about what &#8216;active defense&#8217; in cybersecurity means, and why teams must adopt it as an integral part of their security program and best practices.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Over the last 10 years, I have been a part of multiple incident response projects. The story usually unfolds in a similar fashion – evidence of compromise is on the network. Jump to the &#8216;Cotton Eye Joe&#8217; problem – where did it come from, where does it go. And of course, what did it damage.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Perhaps the most high-pressure scenarios are those where the threat is not just active but is actively moving around the network, say something like ransomware. Machine after machine is getting infected, and there is nothing you can do to stop it.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Consider this nightmare scenario for a moment. You work security for a business with 1000 employees. You don’t have an anti-virus (AV) installed (hypothetical). You have been infected by ransomware. You immediately take a call to purchase an AV, the budget gets freed up, and you go to procure it. But it takes days, even weeks if not months to procure it and push it out to every single workstation and server. Your AV has now future proof-ed you in some way, but the adversary has already finished her attack. You are recovering from the disaster in some form. Maybe you are restoring backups. Maybe you just paid up the ransom. The response was required in minutes and hours. That battle was lost.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>The fallouts of such incidents can be brutal. There is intense pressure on security teams, and they carry heavy burdens. I have seen security folks stay up 96 hours at a stretch, trying to squeeze in a couple of minutes of sleep in offices amid thousands of messages, texts, and calls. I have seen top management in companies get involved and ask tough questions to which there are no good answers.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>If you are involved in any security function in your organization, at any level, this should be relatable. To some, something like this might have happened recently. For some, it’s been a while. And if it hasn&#8217;t happened to you yet, chances are, it will happen at some point – sooner rather than later.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>And then let’s talk money. It costs a lot of money. I’m talking serious cash. In the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars. All being spent in a matter of days. You are paying your vendors, service providers, advisors, and implementers. You are paying by the hour for everyone involved in the response, IT teams, security teams, and active directory teams. And then people wonder why cybersecurity is a $123 billion industry.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>It gets chaotic.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>In my experience, you can contain that chaos with an Active Defense mindset.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Active defense isn’t really a new concept. For example, the armed forces and police have active defense protocols. If intelligence picks up an impending threat, the machinery kicks in to reflect the seriousness of the threat. Intensified checking at posts, barricades across high-value locations and roads, enhanced protective measures for ministers and other high-value targets, orders to restrict the movement of people and goods, frequent patrolling – you get the drift.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Now notice this strategy for a moment. It includes a lot of tough calls because the threat has a material impact on the life of civilians. There’s a protocol in place. Also, notice that the strategy doesn&#8217;t involve waiting for the bad guy to move around as he pleases. It actively tries to smoke the threat out. The alternative is to play catch up. Always one step behind the threat. Ring any bells? Of course, it does because that&#8217;s exactly what we do in cybersecurity.&nbsp;</p>\n\n\n\n<p>What I&#8217;m getting to is that when you are in the midst of an incident, you have ways to try to smoke out the threat, make life difficult for the adversary, and minimize the impact of the breach. One that can be measured in days (if not hours), will not be as costly and will reign in panic.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>It involves barricades, restriction of movement, enhanced patrolling, and of course, protecting the crown jewels.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s how it might look like in a real-life &#8216;incident&#8217;:</p>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Block the movement of traffic between computers by enabling your pre-created firewall blocking policy.</li><li>Shut down Internet access, either from specific segments or universally.</li><li>Sinkhole traffic for suspicious connections.</li><li>Initiate an on-going indicator check against crown jewels.</li><li>Initiate backup of critical data and crown jewels.</li><li><a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/threat-detection-with-deception-technology/\">Spin up decoy systems and users.</a></li><li>Lockdown usage of privileged accounts.</li><li>Actively monitor the movement of administrative accounts and flag suspicious activity.</li></ul>\n\n\n\n<p>This is, of course, a non-exhaustive list but all of these can be really quick to do! The biggest impediment is usually taking the tough calls as this may temporarily and disrupt services. It also happens because of poor team communication across the board. It is because of this that we forgo a defensive advantage and chase the threat for days and months on end.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>But hey, if you drill this out before things go wrong, you will already know and understand what the impact is going to be.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>Think about it this way. You have an existing set of software defenses. That should make life difficult for the software tactics of the threat. Active defense is you putting additional software defenses to attack the human behind the threat.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>This brings me back to why MITRE Shield couldn&#8217;t have come sooner. For the first time, defenders have a shared vocabulary and framework for what they can proactively do to defend their networks. It even maps out to MITRE ATT&amp;CK, telling you exactly which defense can disrupt an attack tactic. I strongly urge you to check out Shield.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>If you need help with understanding this more, we are running 30 mins workshops to deconstruct MITRE Shield and breakdown how you can get started with active defense. <a href=\"https://meetings.hubspot.com/sahirh/active-defense-workshop\">Feel free to sign up here</a>.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>We have also released our mapping to MITRE Shield. With Smokescreen, you can achieve 95% coverage of all the active defense techniques included in the framework. You can get the mapping <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/resources/adopting-the-mitre-shield-framework-with-smokescreen/\">from here.</a> And if you want to see all of this in action, you can always ask for a demo.</p>\n\n\n\n<p>I&#8217;m very excited about all the conversations that are happening around MITRE Shield. As we help our customers implement Shield and achieve more active defense coverage, I will be sharing what I learn. Feel free to hit me up on <a href=\"https://www.linkedin.com/in/sudarshan-pisupati-607b0ab/\">LinkedIn</a> or <a href=\"https://twitter.com/Sudartion\">Twitter</a>.</p>\n","excerpt":"Active defense provides defenders with a shared vocabulary and framework for actively dealing with threats instead of passively reacting to them.\n","slug":"active-defense-for-incident-responders","date":"2020-12-29T01:34:46.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2021-01-24T16:42:40.000Z","wordpress_id":18639,"featured_media":{"id":"b7c5bd0f-1190-59a5-8777-52cae2404171","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Smokescreen-Active-defense-blog-post-scaled.jpeg","alt_text":"Active 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The parallels between deception in the real-world, and deception in cyberspace are clear and easy to understand. However, in the digital battlefield it&#8217;s far more nuanced &#8212; it&#8217;s easy to do it badly, and far harder to get it right. Which makes it rather similar to a more traditional security practice &#8212; cryptography.</p>\n<p>Cryptographers are familiar with a well-known axiom called <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs's_principle\">Kerckhoff&#8217;s principle</a>, which states:</p>\n<blockquote><p>A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.</p></blockquote>\n<p>This was famously paraphrased by Claude Shannon in what is known as Shannon&#8217;s Maxim:</p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;The enemy knows the system&#8220;, i.e., &#8220;one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them&#8220;</p></blockquote>\n<p>The applicability to deception is immediately apparent. It should remain effective, even when an attacker:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Knows that deception technology is deployed</li>\n<li>Knows the full capabilities of the specific solution</li>\n<li>Intuitively understands where the decoys may be deployed (ATM, SWIFT, SCADA, IoT etc.)</li>\n</ul>\n<p>However, the exact map of the minefield &#8212; the specific placement of decoys, their running services, and their content is not known. This deception map is the equivalent of the secret key in a crypto-system. As long as the map is not known to the attacker, the illusion should still remain extremely effective, despite the attacker having complete visibility into the rest of the system.</p>\n<p>At <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/\">Smokescreen</a>, we are laser focused on making sure deception is &#8216;done right&#8217; &#8212; with the necessary rigour and formal reasoning to hold up in real-world conditions. How do we do this? Our depth of experience in related cybersecurity disciplines is our secret weapon. We apply hard earned knowledge from red-teaming, <a href=\"https://www.smokescreen.io/lenny-zeltser-on-protean-security-tactics\">asymmetric thinking</a>, threat hunting, cryptography and incident response to build the most formidable and effective deception system available.</p>\n","excerpt":"The parallels between deception in the real-world, and deception in cyberspace are clear and easy to understand. However, deception in the digital battlefield is far more nuanced — it’s easy to do it badly, and far harder to get it right. Which makes it rather similar to a more traditional security practice — cryptography.\n","slug":"deception-and-kerckhoffss-cryptographic-principle","date":"2017-02-16T10:50:52.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2020-01-06T07:05:07.000Z","wordpress_id":16772,"featured_media":{"id":"c7ca7a31-c5f1-5880-8111-9cbfd1198f24","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Enigma-plugboard.jpg","alt_text":"Deception","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.4705882352941178,"src":"/static/33488cec05051fdb0cde315fb03b25b1/14b42/Enigma-plugboard.jpg","srcSet":"/static/33488cec05051fdb0cde315fb03b25b1/f836f/Enigma-plugboard.jpg 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