Malware detection is a whack-a-mole game. Like the mythical hydra, when you chop off one head, three more appear, But that’s just half the issue.
\nBypassing anti-malware systems is so trivial that attackers don’t treat it as a major obstacle. Even newbie pen-testers know how to go from off-the-shelf malware to “fully undetectable”. Believe me, the attackers have it automated, and commoditised.
\nWorse still, savvy attackers don’t even rely on malware to accomplish their mission objectives. Nowadays, they get by fine with:
\nPowershell
\nProvides practically any functionality an attacker wants. See the exemplary work by Matt Graeber on Powersploit and Nikhil Mittal with Nishang. When you can build tools on the box, why risk dropping a binary?
Legitimate administrative tools
\nTeamviewer, pstools, AmmyAdmin and the like. Organisations use these tools to legitimately administer their systems. Well, so do modern attackers. You’re unlikely to find an anti-malware solution that takes a chance blocking something that might be a critical tool for your IT ops team. Attackers know and exploit this free pass. Application white-listing, sandboxing, heuristics, and signatures all go for a toss.
Stolen credentials
\nThe FIN-4 APT attacks exemplify how devastating malware-free attacks can be. Through the use of stolen credentials and legitimate access channels alone, an attacker has more than enough to succeed.
Dmitri Alperovitch of CrowdStrike said it well in his recent article:
\n\nMalware is responsible for only 40 percent of breaches and external attackers are increasingly leveraging malware-free intrusion approaches in order to blend in and fly under the radar by assuming insider credentials within victim organizations… Once the adversary was inside the network, they were able to move around using legitimate credentials and windows system administration tools, without actual use of malware.
As we said in the beginning, malware detection is a failing startegy. Stop solving the symptoms, and start solving the problem.
\n","excerpt":"Bypassing anti-malware systems is so trivial that attackers don’t treat it as a major obstacle. Even newbie pen-testers know how to go from off-the-shelf malware to “fully undetectable”. Attackers have it automated. Stop solving the symptoms, and start solving the problem.\n","slug":"malware-detection-is-a-failing-strategy","date":"2015-09-10T15:23:21.000Z","modified":"2020-01-06T04:56:20.000Z","status":"publish","featured_media":{"id":"0ade6974-5504-5406-a330-9ecc8c86a91d","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/1417280716_malware.jpg","alt_text":"Malware detection","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.7857142857142858,"src":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/14b42/1417280716_malware.jpg","srcSet":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/f836f/1417280716_malware.jpg 200w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/2244e/1417280716_malware.jpg 400w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/14b42/1417280716_malware.jpg 800w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/67316/1417280716_malware.jpg 950w","srcWebp":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/58556/1417280716_malware.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/61e93/1417280716_malware.webp 200w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/1f5c5/1417280716_malware.webp 400w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/58556/1417280716_malware.webp 800w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/ba86a/1417280716_malware.webp 950w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.765625,"src":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/32fd5/1417280716_malware.jpg","srcSet":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/06e94/1417280716_malware.jpg 113w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/07ab6/1417280716_malware.jpg 225w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/32fd5/1417280716_malware.jpg 450w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/4a838/1417280716_malware.jpg 675w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/9842e/1417280716_malware.jpg 900w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/67316/1417280716_malware.jpg 950w","srcWebp":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/b8a88/1417280716_malware.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/3a3bf/1417280716_malware.webp 113w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/975bf/1417280716_malware.webp 225w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/b8a88/1417280716_malware.webp 450w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/761da/1417280716_malware.webp 675w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/210c1/1417280716_malware.webp 900w,\n/static/4c2a301349b977538dce5b534799d5fc/ba86a/1417280716_malware.webp 950w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"categories":[{"id":"8240d552-b9aa-5391-8be4-81a12ec20f38","slug":"malware","name":"malware"},{"id":"0aaaa4e2-c9fd-5357-95d2-3884b38b33c0","slug":"strategy","name":"strategy"}],"author":{"id":"9257cd1e-ca7f-578b-a2dd-9c2e74282caf","name":"Smokescreen Team"},"yoast_meta":{"yoast_wpseo_twitter_title":"","yoast_wpseo_twitter_description":"","yoast_wpseo_redirect":"","yoast_wpseo_opengraph_title":"","yoast_wpseo_opengraph_description":"","yoast_wpseo_metakeywords":"","yoast_wpseo_metadesc":"Malware detection is a whack-a-mole game. Like the mythical hydra, when you chop off one head, three more appear, But that's just half the issue.","yoast_wpseo_meta_robots_noindex":"","yoast_wpseo_meta_robots_nofollow":"","yoast_wpseo_meta_robots_adv":"","yoast_wpseo_linkdex":"77","yoast_wpseo_focuskw":"Malware detection","yoast_wpseo_canonical":""}},"relatedPosts":{"edges":[{"node":{"id":"58eb6f3c-c8ac-5680-a020-d1cc788cadbb","title":"The pragmatic security leader’s guide to deception technology","content":"\nDeception technology provides a unique approach to detecting adversary activity in a network. Compared to other detection controls, it’s easier to deploy, gives you greater visibility, and solves your false positives problem.
\n\n\n\nLet’s cut to the chase, shall we? Of course, I’m going to say this. I work for a company that sells a deception solution. I’m quite sure that if you’ve ever spoken to a deception vendor, you would have heard a similar pitch. If you haven’t talked to one, well, that’s more or less what you’re going to hear in a nutshell.
\n\n\n\nWhile what I’ve stated above is accurate, there are nuances to every approach. As they say, when it comes to cybersecurity, there are no silver bullets. I’m writing this post because when you’re evaluating technology or deploying it, you must understand the conditions under which it can be effective. It allows you to be pragmatic and set realistic expectations.
\n\n\n\nIn the next couple of paragraphs, I’m going to delve into nuances of deception technology that often don’t make it to marketing materials.
\n\n\n\nAs with any security control, there are several components that come together to make deception effective. For now, I’m going to focus on the three most important properties that can make or break a deception technology deployment. These are:
\n\n\n\nIn an ideal world, every deceptive component should exhibit all three properties in totality. The reality, however, is different.
\n\n\n\nSome decoys will be visible to folks inside your company but will be a popular target for attackers. Some will have limited realism but will not be fingeprintable. The point is, when you’re deploying deception in a living, breathing network, trade-offs have to be made – sometimes because of internal limitations, and other times because that’s the best strategy.
\n\n\n\nIn my experience, an understanding of these three properties helps in deciding what trade-offs to make and what you can expect. Let’s break them down one by one.
\n\n\n\nVisibility is an important consideration when deploying deceptive components. In organizations, highly visible decoys will lead to false positives and noise. However, the decoys themselves may be the only effective way to detect an adversary. Being aware of different deceptive components and their visibility property can help inform your thinking about what to do. Here’s a handy table.
\n\n\n\n| Component | Visibility to regular users |
| Private Threat Intelligence (Internet-facing decoys) | Not visible |
| Internal network decoys | Not visible |
| Active Directory decoys | Not visible |
| MiTM Deception | Not visible |
| Endpoint Deception – File Decoys | * Invisible unless the user chooses the option to show hidden files. * The Endpoint deception policy allows file decoys to be hidden to make them invisible to regular users. |
| Endpoint Deception – Browser Lures | * Cookies are invisible to the user. * Credentials may be viewed if the user browses to the Saved Password page. * Browser Favorites will be visible to the user. |
| Endpoint Deception – Session Lures | * Network Shares and Windows Credentials are placed in Credential Manager and rarely accessed by regular users and are therefore effectively invisible. * Session Lures created for software like PuTTY and WinSCP will be visible in the panel of saved sessions. |
| Endpoint Deception – Privilege Escalation | Not visible |
| Endpoint Deception – Defense Evasion | Effectively invisible. Fake Processes are visible in Task Manager but they masquerade as a real process and hide in plain sight. |
If an adversary can fingerprint your deceptive assets, she will be able to avoid them altogether. That can’t be good, can it? Here are a couple of things to consider when looking at deception solutions to figure out if they’re fingerprintable.
\n\n\n\nWhat are the characteristics of the decoys?
\n\n\n\nFor decoys deployed to the network, network characteristics can result in fingerprinting. While it’s relatively easy to fake characteristics like MAC addresses, Hostnames, and IP addresses, NetBIOS names are harder to spoof as they are tied to the machine itself.
\n\n\n\nAre they high interaction?
\n\n\n\nAll deception components have a limitation to the extent to which they fool an adversary. However, it’s important to test whether interacting with a deception component gives away large portions of your deployment. If decoys are created using multiple virtual network adapters from a single machine, it is likely that once you login to a decoy and run “ipconfig / ifconfig”, you will be able to figure out all the decoys projected from that host.
\n\n\n\nTest open-source fingerprinting tools
\n\n\n\nOpen-source fingerprinting tools like HoneypotBuster, attempt to fingerprint deception in active directory and fake credentials in memory. We recommend testing these tools, especially on computer objects in Active Directory as they contain properties that cannot be easily modified in a deception scenario. Also, tools like HoneypotBuster check only the domain from which the tool is run and will not check domains that are trusted in any way. Ensure that you run the tool against the domain where the deception has been configured in Active Directory.
\n\n\n\nThe realism of a deception component is critical to keeping an attacker engaged. Ideally, the component should be real enough that it allows the adversary to reveal tools, tactics, and techniques that are being used in your environment. It should also provide you with enough telemetry to determine what the next steps should be.
\n\n\n\nThe overarching goal here is to make the deception component real enough to engage the adversary for long enough so that you can respond to the event.
\n\n\n\nHere is some guidance for ensuring that the deception technology components you opt for meet the realism criteria:
\n\n\n\nWhen evaluating deception technology, visibility, realism, and fingerprinting should be some of the key components that you should closely look at to figure how the solution will play out in your network.
\n","excerpt":"When evaluating deception technology, look at three key components of the solution to ascertain how effective it will be in your environment – visibility, realism, and fingerprintability.\n","slug":"the-pragmatic-security-leaders-guide-to-deception-technology","date":"2021-02-01T04:04:10.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2021-02-01T12:39:33.000Z","wordpress_id":18727,"featured_media":{"id":"2a4ed0d8-6b54-5c32-b562-d58644b889bc","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Maze.jpeg","alt_text":"deception technology","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.5037593984962405,"src":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/14b42/Maze.jpg","srcSet":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/f836f/Maze.jpg 200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/2244e/Maze.jpg 400w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/14b42/Maze.jpg 800w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/47498/Maze.jpg 1200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/0e329/Maze.jpg 1600w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/42f14/Maze.jpg 1651w","srcWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/58556/Maze.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/61e93/Maze.webp 200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/1f5c5/Maze.webp 400w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/58556/Maze.webp 800w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/99238/Maze.webp 1200w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/7c22d/Maze.webp 1600w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/34b00/Maze.webp 1651w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.5066666666666666,"src":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/32fd5/Maze.jpg","srcSet":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/06e94/Maze.jpg 113w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/07ab6/Maze.jpg 225w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/32fd5/Maze.jpg 450w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/4a838/Maze.jpg 675w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/9842e/Maze.jpg 900w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/42f14/Maze.jpg 1651w","srcWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/b8a88/Maze.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/3a3bf/Maze.webp 113w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/975bf/Maze.webp 225w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/b8a88/Maze.webp 450w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/761da/Maze.webp 675w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/210c1/Maze.webp 900w,\n/static/bb6b3e0811f2e1fac8c855c6c38b11f2/34b00/Maze.webp 1651w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"author":{"id":"765e8417-7ed6-55b7-95a7-1d561141e760","name":"Sudarshan Pisupati"}}},{"node":{"id":"e3cd17da-d028-5fad-bd26-31d9b3a4604d","title":"Using deception to shield the insurance sector","content":"\nLet’s cut to the chase, insurance companies are under siege from cyberattacks. An Accenture report from 2020 shows that attacks on insurers have more than doubled from 240 to 519, on average. Insurers also sit on top of sensitive customer data and are at risk of losing it – 44% exposed more than 500,000 customer records in 2019 compared to 15% for cross-industry peers.
\n\n\n\nAs more people around the world come under the ambit of insurance policies, the risk to insurers continues to grow. In this post, we take a look at some of the key pieces of an insurer’s infrastructure that adversaries target, why they go after it, and how you can use deception to build active defenses that mitigate the risk of these attacks and put you in a better position to detect and contain these threats,
\n\n\n\nFor a moment, step into the shoes of a malicious entity targeting an insurance company. Your goal is to get $$$. What are your best opportunities?
\n\n\n\nThe database of all policyholders and their policy details, complete with confidential and protected information is perhaps the most valuable asset of an insurer. This would be the holy grail of compromises. Given that a lot of this information is distributed across many systems (some of them legacy), protecting them is a challenge for the sector.
\n\n\n\nNot only would this data sell for a neat sum on the underground market, but it can also be weaponized in numerous ways, including and not limited to:
\n\n\n\nTo achieve this target, adversaries will have to invest time and money into:
\n\n\n\nCost-benefit analysis reveals Low to medium risk with an extremely high payout.
\n\n\n\nAdvanced and organized criminal syndicates.
\n\n\n\nInsurance companies deal with lots of files. Lots and lots of files. If an adversary succeeds in encrypting as many files as possible, the payout from this activity can be significant.
\n\n\n\nRansomware operators of any sophistication.
\n\n\n\nInsurance companies worldwide are expected to digitize their interactions with consumers. Everything from pre-sales to claims management is expected to be made available to consumers directly in a bid to simplify the consumer experience. This involves the adoption of cloud services, moving previously internal systems to Internet-facing infrastructure, and spinning up even more infrastructure to support business objectives. Adversaries now have a wider attack surface available to them to exploit.
\n\n\n\nMapping external infrastructure is a trivial task and therefore there are minimal considerations for groups adopting this approach.
\n\n\n\nLow effort with payout equivalent to the criticality of the infrastructure they compromise.
\n\n\n\nCybercriminals of any sophistication.
\n\n\n\nDeception is about tilting the odds of winning in your favor. It’s about making reasonable judgments about what the adversary might go after and presenting that information to them on a platter. Deception is about abstracting defenses to individual attacker techniques with lesser effort and increased cost to the attacker.
\n\n\n\nThe core principle of deception is the idea that any interaction with a decoy can be viewed as suspicious and warrants immediate action.
\n\n\n\nBroadly, the plan is to plant decoys across the network, from perimeter to end-point, to deceive the adversary. At a high-level, the following locations will be configured with decoys:
\n\n\n\nBy spreading decoys across the infrastructure, we maximize our chances of detecting adversaries. Remember, we only need to be able to detect the adversary once.
\n\n\n\nThe following is a break-down of what this might look like in practice.
\n\n\n\nLet’s say you don’t want to use deception. The alternative is to understand and defend yourself against every attacker technique. As per MITRE ATT&CK, these are over 100 and this does not account for variations in how these attacks might be executed.
\n\n\n\nDeception is grounded in addressing the motivations of the adversary and presenting fake information on a platter that adversaries find attractive. It is technique-agnostic and abstracts away the complexity that arises from blocking individual tools, techniques, and behaviors.
\n\n\n\nDeception is a form of Active Defense, where security teams take proactive steps to channel the adversary and make their life difficult. It varies from regular defense where you wait for an existing system to generate an alarm and then react.
\n\n\n\nMITRE new active defense framework, Shield, is being adopted by CISOs around the world and we see this approach being embraced by more and more security teams at insurance companies.
Pentest reports tell a story. The story of how the team managed to break into your environment. In my experience, a critical component usually missing from these reports is the rationale behind the choices made by the pentesters who ran the assessment.
\n\n\n\nAsking why allows you to deconstruct choices that real threat actors might make in your environment. Having a sense of those choices will give you some active defense opportunities.
\n\n\n\nLet me demonstrate this with a little thought experiment. Let’s consider a pentest where the objective was to demonstrate access to the customer database. Here’s what the pentesters broadly did:
\n\n\n\nIn each of these steps, the pentesters made some choices. As you’ll now see, deconstructing these choices can help build better defenses.
\n\n\n\nThe Active Defense matrix was released by MITRE to provide a framework for identifying opportunities where adversary behavior can be influenced to enable defenders to easily spot threats.
\n\n\n\nThe foundation of the Active Defense approach rests on three principles:
\n\n\n\nSo let’s begin by deconstructing each of the 7 steps in the report to identify Active Defense opportunities
\n\n\n\nBlock PowerShell to force the adversary to use non-PowerShell options.
\n\n\n\nSince PowerShell usage for C2 is fairly common, it reduces the risk of being hit with commodity malware that uses PowerShell even today.
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Security Controls
\n\n\n\nSetup attractive decoy accounts, assign attractive privileges, and setup attribute level auditing on description, SPN, etc. to monitor enumeration attempts. This has the added advantage of detecting password spraying regardless of intensity and staggering strategies.
\n\n\n\nGain insight into enumeration activities being conducted against the domain from a user perspective.
\n\n\n\n(Note: Don’t ever use these accounts for any operations. There are ways to make this opsec safe)
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Decoy Account
\n\n\n\nSetup decoy computers, assign attractive hostnames to databases, and setup attribute level auditing on description, SPN, etc. to monitor enumeration attempts.
\n\n\n\nGain insight into enumeration activities being conducted against the domain from a computer perspective.
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Decoy System
\n\n\n\nLet’s assume that Kerberoasting was the privilege escalation technique that worked. In this case, let’s also assume that the service account was a domain admin.
\n\n\n\nMakes the adversary believe they have obtained hashes to the customer database SQL service account while at the same time removing the risk of kerberoasting a real domain admin account.
\n\n\n\nA similar approach can be used for other popular privilege escalation techniques.
\n\n\n\nThere are many techniques available for privilege escalation, and some of them lend themselves well to an Active Defense approach. However, in cases where that doesn’t work, focus on what the adversary intends to accomplish with those privileged credentials.
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Decoy Account, Decoy System, Security Controls
\n\n\n\nEven a single port query against the decoy SQL server system is worth investigating while complicating access to the real customer database.
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Network Diversity, Decoy Diversity, Network Manipulation
\n\n\n\nEven a single port query against the decoy SQL server system is worth investigating while complicating access to the real customer database
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Standard Operating Procedure, Decoy Credentials
\n\n\n\nUnfortunately, if the adversary has reached this point, detection difficulty increases. This is because, from an analytics perspective, you are looking for a legitimate account, logging into a legitimate database, and running possibly legitimate queries. However, there are still things we can do.
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Technique: Hunting, System Activity Monitoring
\n\n\n\nI present an abstracted approach to applying Active Defense use cases. It has 4 pieces:
\n\n\n\nYou can use the above as a combination to assess a use case beyond just analyzing pentest reports. The pentest report was just a means for me to present my idea.
\n\n\n\nI would like you to note a few things.
\n\n\n\nFor free, of course.
\n\n\n\nAt this point, I’m positive that you’ve heard of MITRE Shield. It’s a new active defense knowledge base released by MITRE – stuff they’ve been implementing for over a decade to engage adversaries and derail attacks. They’ve opened it up to everyone, and for the first time perhaps, the infosec community has a shared vocabulary and framework for actively defending against attacks instead of reacting to them.
\n\n\n\nI’ve been having conversations about MITRE Shield and Active Defense with CISOs and customers. While some of the conversations are basic and around what is active defense and why does it matter, what I consistently hear from across the board is – “how do we even begin to implement this stuff?” That’s a fair question, but it’s only one part. What more folks aren’t asking is, where do we implement active defenses for the most impact.
\n\n\n\nI’ve zeroed down on four active defense techniques from the MITRE Shield matrix that address both the questions – how do I get started with this and where should I be building active defenses first. Think of this as a soft launch guide for your Active Defense journey.
\n\n\n\nI’ve selected techniques based on two factors:
\n\n\n\nAs a result, all four defenses are Active Directory exclusive. Active Directory has become an adversary favorite attack vector. By deploying active defenses in Active Directory, you’ll be able to make great strides in disrupting adversary actions.
\n\n\n\nOnly two:
\n\n\n\nLet’s dive right in.
\n\n\n\nMITRE Shield Procedure – DPR002
\n\n\n\nPlant decoy accounts in your Active Directory. Any interaction with these accounts is a high-confidence indicator of compromise. These accounts will also help you study the adversary’s actions, mislead attackers by putting these accounts in their path during enumeration, and use them to influence the attacker’s actions and next steps.
\n\n\n\nSet up a decoy account and give it “Domain Admin” privileges. This will make the account interesting to the adversary.
\n\n\n\nIn this video, we focus on detecting the operation. We show how to setup Windows Auditing so that we can capture the appropriate log. We also demonstrate an attack to test if the logs are captured appropriately.
\n\n\n\nPsuedo-code for detection rule:
\n\n\n\nIf login_activity observed for decoy_account then raise a high priority alert.\n\n\n\n
MITRE Shield Procedures – DPR0022 and DPR0033
\n\n\n\nDecoy systems are an excellent active defense tool because they act as a target to lure away attackers from legitimate assets. Decoy content could be anything ranging from fake files to browser shortcuts that act as breadcrumbs to point adversaries to decoy systems.
\n\n\n\nIn this video, we set up a webserver on our test machine to channel an adversary towards interacting with it. We create a browser shortcut and place it in a publically accessible location on the Active Directory Server to make it easier for the adversary to discover.
\n\n\n\nWe ensure that our web server is logging connections. If an adversary attempts to conduct reconnaissance against this webserver, we should see a logline in the webserver log.
\n\n\n\nPsuedo-code for detection rule:
\n\n\n\nIf REQUEST observed for /admin then raise a high priority alert.\n\n\n\n
MITRE Shield Procedure – DPR0024
\n\n\n\nDecoy credentials are fake usernames and passwords that can be planted in a variety of places including in the Active Directory. They act as silent alarms when interacted with and also as a means to delay the attacker.
\n\n\n\nIn this video, we create a batch file planted with fake credentials and store it in a publically accessible location on the Active Directory Server to make it easier for the adversary to discover.
\n\n\n\nIn this video, we show how to set up auditing on your test machine to capture attempts to use the credentials against your test machine.
\n\n\n\nPsuedo-code for detection rule:
\n\n\n\nIf login_event is 4625 AND username is admin\n\n\n\n
Then raise a high priority alert.
MITRE Shield Procedure – DPR0052
\n\n\n\nPocket litter is an active defense technique used to mislead attackers into thinking that the system and user they’re exploiting are legit. You plant fake documents, browser history, browser sessions, etc. to give adversaries the confidence that they are on the right track.
\n\n\n\nIn this video, we will set up a file share on the test machine. We will plant a shortcut to this file share in a publically accessible location on the Active Directory Server to make it easier for the adversary to discover.
\n\n\n\nIn this video, we show how to set up file share auditing on your test machine to capture attempts to access the file share on your machine.
\n\n\n\nPsuedo-code for detection rule:
\n\n\n\nIf login_event is 5140 AND share_name contains shared_folder_name\nThen raise a high priority alert.\n\n\n\n
These folders are accessible to all users within your environment. Over time, these folders accrue a lot of files and scripts that are interesting to adversaries. We wish to use these folders to misdirect the attacker, should the attacker go browsing through these folders. It is also uncommon for regular users to require to browse through this folder.
\n\n\n\nThe focus of this guide was to get your mind thinking about active defense. If there’s one thing I’d like you to walk away with, it’s that if any of these defenses trigger an alarm you will have discovered malicious activity for a couple of hours of effort. And it cost you nothing.
\n\n\n\nAt Smokescreen, we’ve been implementing active defense programs since before it was a thing. No wonder then that Smokescreen covered 95% of MITRE Shield when it launched in Sep 2020. If you’d like to see how we can help, hit us up. Here’s a mapping of Smokescreen to MITRE Shield if it’s helpful.
\n\n\n\nWe’re also running active defense workshops where we deconstruct MITRE Shield and talk about how you can implement it. Feel free to sign up.
\n","excerpt":"For free, of course. At this point, I’m positive that you’ve heard of MITRE Shield. It’s a new active defense knowledge base released by MITRE – stuff they’ve been implementing for over a decade to engage adversaries and derail attacks. They’ve opened it up to everyone, and for the first time perhaps, the infosec community […]\n","slug":"four-mitre-shield-techniques-you-can-implement-in-2021","date":"2020-12-30T16:48:39.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2021-02-03T07:14:04.000Z","wordpress_id":18652,"featured_media":{"id":"3b48d9b0-598d-52ec-92d7-1eef58be5ea8","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png","alt_text":"Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.9047619047619047,"src":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/ee604/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png","srcSet":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/69585/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 200w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/497c6/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 400w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/ee604/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 800w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/f3583/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 1200w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/5707d/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 1600w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/0ef64/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 2400w","srcWebp":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/58556/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/61e93/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 200w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/1f5c5/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 400w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/58556/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 800w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/99238/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 1200w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/7c22d/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 1600w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/f1e40/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 2400w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.9152542372881356,"src":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/62b1f/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png","srcSet":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/e7519/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 113w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/7e7e9/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 225w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/62b1f/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 450w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/e2e7f/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 675w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/db955/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 900w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/0ef64/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.png 2400w","srcWebp":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/b8a88/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/3a3bf/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 113w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/975bf/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 225w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/b8a88/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 450w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/761da/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 675w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/210c1/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 900w,\n/static/edada2176ce537fff9fc98c912eee812/f1e40/Smokescreen-MITRE-Shield-Techniques.webp 2400w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"author":{"id":"765e8417-7ed6-55b7-95a7-1d561141e760","name":"Sudarshan Pisupati"}}},{"node":{"id":"13ba7811-8420-5fbe-afba-edab7cde09f4","title":"Open Source Honeypots That Detect Threats For Free","content":"If you’re a target for either financially motivated cyber criminals, or nation state grade attackers, chances are your security team feels outgunned. Deception technology excels at detecting these attacks by shifting the cognitive, economic and time costs of the attack back onto the attacker. The principles of deception have been around for years, and recently, they’ve become the secret weapon of purple teams and threat hunters worldwide. Here’s the good new — You can start seeing the benefits of deception for free using open source honeypots that can be deployed immediately.
\nDeception is so crucial to detecting lateral movement, uncovering privilege escalation, and building threat intelligence, that any deception, even open-source honeypots are valuable. Whenever we’re on the road, we make it a point to give a shout-out to some of these tools, and will happily help you plan how you can use them. And we’ll do this for free, no strings attached. Just get in touch!
\nCaveat Emptor: You get what you pay for — Some of these tools may no longer be supported, and will require leg-work to setup and see results. However, they’re a great way to get familiar with deception. They’re also emulations, not real systems, so don’t expect high-interaction activity. While we’ll offer friendly advice around how you can use them, we don’t officially support them.
\nFor more on planning effective deception, check out our strategy focused blog-posts:
\nSetting up most of these open source honeypots in a lab should be a fairly simple weekend project for seasoned security professionals. You can then run red-team style attacks against them to understand what sort of telemetry you can expect. Finally, you can tweak the source to reduce how easily they can be fingerprinted (don’t forget to submit patches to the authors if you do).
\nIf you’d like to take the next step with professional deception technology, check out our IllusionBLACK platform by seeing a live demo.
\n","excerpt":"If you’re a target for either financially motivated cyber-criminals, or nation-state grade attackers, chances are your security team feels outgunned. Deception technology excels at detecting these attacks by shifting the cognitive, economic and time costs of the attack back onto the attacker.\n","slug":"practical-honeypots-a-list-of-open-source-deception-tools-that-detect-threats-for-free","date":"2017-09-20T12:18:42.000Z","status":"publish","modified":"2020-09-14T06:17:12.000Z","wordpress_id":16927,"featured_media":{"id":"fe9a8c35-b0a3-525e-b272-29dd6f0cbf3b","source_url":"https://ss-website-content-prod.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpeg","alt_text":"Open source honeypots","large":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.5037593984962405,"src":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/14b42/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg","srcSet":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/f836f/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 200w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/2244e/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 400w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/14b42/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 800w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/47498/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 1200w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/0e329/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 1600w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/eeda9/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 1650w","srcWebp":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/58556/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/61e93/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 200w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/1f5c5/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 400w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/58556/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 800w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/99238/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 1200w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/7c22d/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 1600w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/36d36/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 1650w","sizes":"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px"}}},"medium":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.5066666666666666,"src":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/32fd5/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg","srcSet":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/06e94/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 113w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/07ab6/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 225w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/32fd5/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 450w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/4a838/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 675w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/9842e/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 900w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/eeda9/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.jpg 1650w","srcWebp":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/b8a88/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/3a3bf/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 113w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/975bf/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 225w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/b8a88/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 450w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/761da/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 675w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/210c1/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 900w,\n/static/03cd33bfc3eac071715696dc4b64baf3/36d36/Open-source-honeypots-Smokescreen.webp 1650w","sizes":"(max-width: 450px) 100vw, 450px"}}}},"author":{"id":"9257cd1e-ca7f-578b-a2dd-9c2e74282caf","name":"Smokescreen Team"}}}]},"costSectionImage":{"childImageSharp":{"fluid":{"base64":"","aspectRatio":1.528735632183908,"src":"/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/651c0/cost-image-2x.png","srcSet":"/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/e223a/cost-image-2x.png 133w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/66882/cost-image-2x.png 265w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/651c0/cost-image-2x.png 530w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/a384c/cost-image-2x.png 795w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/c884a/cost-image-2x.png 1056w","srcWebp":"/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/46494/cost-image-2x.webp","srcSetWebp":"/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/a5ef1/cost-image-2x.webp 133w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/4dc00/cost-image-2x.webp 265w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/46494/cost-image-2x.webp 530w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/5b747/cost-image-2x.webp 795w,\n/static/739e365bb81f8bf83185927701d2793f/950f5/cost-image-2x.webp 1056w","sizes":"(max-width: 530px) 100vw, 530px"}}}},"pageContext":{"id":"1d2ea42d-0050-51fc-ba1d-1764bdcbceaa","relatedPostsIDs":[16927,18727,18716,18707,18652]}},"staticQueryHashes":["1478079672"]}